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FROM THE PERIPHERY TO THE CENTER?
THE EVOLVING WTO JURISPRUDENCE ON
TRANSPARENCY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE
Padideh Ala’i*

ABSTRACT

The rise of the regulatory state in the latter half of the 20th century is
reflected in the text of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreements
and specifically its transparency related obligations. The oldest transparency
and good governance obligation of the WTO is Article X of General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Article X imposes broad publication and due process requirements on the administration of measures in
the area of trade in goods. The language of Article X is duplicated or incorporated by reference throughout the WTO Agreements. During the GATT
years (1947–94), Article X was a silent provision dismissed by GATT panels
as ‘subsidiary’ to the other ‘substantive’ provisions of the GATT. Since the
creation of the WTO, Article X has emerged from obscurity, and is now
viewed as creating obligations of ‘fundamental importance,’ such as transparency and due process. In addition, there has been an exponential increase in
the number of cases asserting Article X claims before WTO panels and the
Appellate Body. The resulting treatment of such claims by the WTO dispute
settlement bodies reflects both the emerging role of the WTO as a supranational administrative body and the continuing discomfort of panels and the
Appellate Body with applying good governance obligations.
I. INTRODUCTION

This paper traces the jurisprudence of Article X of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1994.1 Article X is significant because it
‘goes to the heart of a country’s legal infrastructure, and more precisely to
the nature and enforcement of its administrative law regime.’2 Article X was
* Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University, Washington, DC.
E-mail: palai@wcl.american.edu. I would like to thank Lana Nigro and Lisa Schopler for
their assistance with this article. An earlier version of this article was delivered at the fourth
Global Administrative Law (GAL) Conference in Viterbo, Italy in June 2008.
1
WTO, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the Legal Texts
(Geneva 2003) 17.
2
Sylvia Ostry, ‘China and the WTO: The Transparency Issue’, 3 UCLA Journal of
International Law and Foreign Affairs 1 (1998), at 2.
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proposed by the United States in 1947, and was influenced by the contemporaneous enactment of the US Administrative Procedures Act (APA).3 Article
X requires that trade related measures be promptly published, administered
in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner and provide for independent
review of administrative action that relates to customs matters.
During the GATT 1947 years,4 Article X was a silent provision dismissed
by panels as ‘subsidiary’ to other ‘substantive’ GATT provisions. Since the
creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), Article X has emerged
from obscurity, and has developed into a provision of fundamental importance as the embodiment of the principles of transparency and due process.5
The relative prominence of Article X in trade disputes in the WTO is a
manifestation of the emerging role of the WTO as a global (supranational)
regulatory body.6 The increased emphasis on Article X also highlights the
potential role for the WTO in promoting ‘good governance’ norms in both
the transnational and domestic context.7
This article will show that WTO Members are increasingly relying on good
governance principles, such as transparency and due process in dispute settlement proceedings. These good governance principles, as embodied in
Article X, are most often invoked in connection with contentious trade
issues, including the administration of anti-dumping or countervailing measures by the US Department of Commerce (DOC).

3
4
5

6

7

5 United States Code (USC) ss 551–559.
WTO, above n 1, at 423.
Transparency is generally defined as ‘sharing information or acting in an open manner’, or ‘a
measure of the degree of which information about official activity is made available to an
interested party’. See William Mock, ‘On the Centrality of Information Law: A Rational
Choice Discussion of Information Law and Transparency’, 17 John Marshall Journal of
Computer and Information Law 1069, 1182 (1999).
In the legal context, the focus of transparency is on procedural due process: publication, access
to and flow of information, and independent judicial review. This article is not concerned with
the internal governance of the WTO or the external transparency of the WTO as it relates to
public (non-state) participation.
In this article ‘governance’ is defined as the ‘process of decision-making and the process by
which decisions are implemented’. See United Nations Economic and Social Commission for
Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), ‘What is Good Governance?,’ http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/
ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.pdf (visited 16 May 2008). The term ‘good governance’ includes five basic characteristics: (1) participation, (2) transparency, (3) responsibility,
(4) accountability, and (5) responsiveness; Commission on Human Rights, ‘Role of Good
Governance in the Promotion of Human Rights’, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2000/64 (April
27, 2000). A strong argument can be made that the cumulative effect of the ‘good governance’
provisions of the WTO, for example requiring notification, publication, participation, responsiveness, and access to information, have potentially far greater impact on domestic governance of states than direct attempts at legal and institutional reform by the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and others. A prominent example of the influence of
WTO’s transparency and good governance provisions is seen in the case of China, where
thousands of pieces of legislation were promulgated in connection with China’s accession to
the WTO.
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The growing centrality of Article X also reflects: (i) an emerging global consensus regarding good governance values such as transparency, access to information, and participation, which must inform both domestic and global
administrative systems; (ii) the evolution of the GATT from a system based
on tariffs, reciprocal bargaining and exchange of concessions to one concerned
with rule-making; and (iii) an attempt by the dispute settlement system to
accommodate the emerging role of the WTO as a rulemaking body by enforcing
its good governance mandate in a manner that avoids political controversy and
charges of overreaching by the Members. For example, as discussed below, a
panel may expansively interpret a provision of Article X, but then either refuse
to address the Article X claim in the name of judicial economy or find that the
measure in question does not in fact violate Article X requirements of transparency or due process.8
This article will first define terms and explore the roots and scope of Article X
of GATT 1994. It will then discuss the application of Article X during the GATT
1947 years (1947–94) when, after being a dormant provision for almost
forty years, it was dismissed in the 1980s and early 1990s as merely subsidiary
to the more ‘substantive’ obligations contained in GATT 1947. It will then
explore the impact of WTO jurisprudence on the scope and application of
Article X’s requirements of transparency and due process by analyzing the interpretations and applications of Article X by the WTO panels and the Appellate
Body from 1995 to the present. This article will then review the most prominent
Article X cases brought under the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU),9 culminating with European
Communities – Selected Customs Matters (EC – Selected Customs Matters), in
which all of the claims were based on alleged violations of Article X.10 Finally,
this article will make some observations about the future of Article X under the
Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) and its implications for the overall goal
and mandate of the WTO.
II. HISTORY OF ARTICLE X OF GATT

1994

Article X was initially proposed by the United States as Article 15 of the draft
Charter of the International Trade Organization (ITO),11 which was subsequently adopted by the GATT 1947 Contracting Parties. At the time of its
adoption, no other country expressed an interest in Article X, and it was
8

9
10

11

In such cases, the panels’ extensive discussion of Art. X provisions may nevertheless set the
stage for the future where international review of domestic administrative regimes may be less
politically controversial. See below, Part VII.
WTO, above n 1, at 354.
WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Selected Customs Matters (EC – Selected
Customs Matters), WT/DS315/AB/R, Adopted on 11 December 2006; WTO Panel Report,
European Communities – Selected Customs Matters, WT/DS315/R, Adopted on 11 December
2006.
Ostry, above n 2, at 3.
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adopted without any discussion or amendment. The proposed text of Article X
generally followed the text of the APA, which was enacted in 1946.12 At the time
of its adoption, the Contracting Parties viewed Article X as creating no new
obligations.13 The text of Article X of GATT 1947 (which remains unchanged
under GATT 1994), states:
(1) Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general
application . . . pertaining to the classification or the valuation of products for
customs purposes, or to rates of duty, taxes or other charges, or to requirements, restrictions or prohibitions on imports or exports, or on the transfer
or payments therefore, or affecting their sale, distribution, transportation . . . or other use shall be published promptly in such manner as to enable
governments and traders to become acquainted with them. Agreements
affecting international trade policy . . . shall also be published.
(2) No measure of general application . . . effecting an advance in a rate of
duty . . . or imposing a new or more burdensome requirement, restriction or
prohibition on imports . . . shall be enforced before such measure has been
officially published.
(3) (a) Each [Member] shall administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all its laws, regulations, decisions and rulings of the kind
described in paragraph 1 . . .
(b) Each [Member] shall maintain, or institute as soon as practicable,
judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose . . . of the prompt review and correction of administrative action relating
to custom matters . . . Such tribunals or procedures shall be independent of
the agencies entrusted with administrative enforcement . . .14

It has been argued that the United States’ motivation for proposing Article
X was to level the playing field for US traders who faced opaque and informal
administrative structures in other countries, while US administrative processes
had been made more transparent with the enactment of the APA.15 Article
X may have been intended to assist US exporters in the post-World War II
12

13

14
15

Article X was also ‘partially based on Articles 4 and 6 of the 1923 International Convention
Relating to the Simplification of Customs Formalities’. See GATT, Analytical Index: Guide to
GATT Law and Practice, (6th ed, WTO & Bernan Press 1995) vol. I, at 309. See also
Padideh Ala’i, ‘The Multilateral Trading System and Transparency, in Trends’, in Alan S.
Alexandroff (ed), World Trade: Essays in Honor of Sylvia Ostry (Durham, NC: Carolina
Academic Press 2007) 105–132 at 105, 108–112 (discussing the history and evolution of
the US APA and its relationship to Art. X of GATT 1947).
In fact, a senior Canadian negotiator is quoted as stating at the time of the original enactment
of Art. X that it contained no additional substantive requirements and should therefore not be
of any concern. Sylvia Ostry, ‘Article X and the Concept of Transparency in the GATT/
WTO’, in Alan S. Alexandroff, Sylvia Ostry and Rafael Gomez (eds), China and the Long
March to Global Trade: The Accession of China to the World Trade Organization (UK: Routledge
2002) 123–24. See also Ostry, above n 2, at 4.
Article X of the GATT, above n 1 (emphasis added).
See John H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT (Charlottesville, Virginia: The Michie
Company 1969) 461–64.
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world, but its provisions may also be interpreted as expressing the values that led
to the enactment of the APA, such as imposing limitations on the exercise of
executive discretion through transparency and due process.16
From 1947–84 there was no mention of Article X in any adopted GATT
panel decisions.17 By the mid-1980s, faced with diminished competitiveness,
the United States became increasingly concerned about the proliferation of
nontariff barriers (NTBs), including non-transparent and ad hoc administration
of customs regulations.18 Early GATT 1947 cases involving Article X were filed
by the United States against Japan’s non-transparent administration of import
quota systems and the extensive use of the informal system of ‘administrative
guidance’ by Japan.19
III. ARTICLE X AND THE GATT

1947

Article X was mentioned in only nine adopted GATT 1947 panel decisions.20
The United States was involved in all of these cases: six as complainant,21
16

17

18

19

20

21

See Ala’i, above n 12, at 109–12 (noting that while the APA may have been an attempt to
limit executive discretion it also led to the rise of the administrative state with the proliferation
of agencies under the executive branch of government).
Prior to the formation of the WTO, the GATT dispute settlement panel was driven by
consensus that required agreement of all parties for the formation or adoption of panel
decisions. The result of this consensus-driven approach was few adopted decisions, and
even fewer dealing with controversial issues that may have threatened the legitimacy of the
system. This may have included avoiding Art. X transparency claims.
These issues were addressed more frequently through other mechanisms. For example, in
1977 the United States passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 USC x 78m(b)(2)(B).
See e.g. GATT Panel Report, Japan – Trade in Semi-Conductors (Japan – Semi-Conductors),
L/6309, Adopted on 4 May 1988; GATT Panel Report, Japan – Restrictions on Imports of
Certain Agricultural Products (Japan – Agricultural Products I), L/6253, Adopted on 2 March
1988; GATT Panel Report, Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather (Japan – Leather II (US)),
L/5623, Adopted on 15 May 1984.
GATT Panel Report, United States – Countervailing Duties on Non-Rubber Footwear from Brazil
(US – Non-Rubber Footwear), SCM/94, Adopted on 13 June 1995; GATT Panel Report,
Canada – Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing
Agencies (Canada – Provincial Liquor Boards (US)), DS17/R, Adopted on 18 February
1992; GATT Panel Report, European Economic Community – Regulation on Imports of Parts
and Components (EEC – Parts and Components), L/6657, Adopted on 16 May 1990; GATT
Panel Report, Canada – Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and Yoghurt (Canada – Ice Cream and
Yoghurt), L/6568, Adopted on 5 December 1989; GATT Panel Report, European Economic
Community – Restrictions on Imports of Apples – Complaint by the United States (EEC – Apples
(US)), L/6513, Adopted on 22 June 1989; GATT Panel Report, European Economic
Community – Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples – Complaint by Chile (EEC – Dessert
Apples), L/6491, Adopted on 22 June 1989; GATT Panel Report, Republic of Korea –
Restrictions on Imports of Beef – Complaint by the United States (Korea – Beef (US)), L/6503,
Adopted on 7 November 1989; GATT Panel Report, Japan – Semi-Conductors, above n 19;
GATT Panel Report, Japan – Agricultural Products I, above n 19; GATT Panel Report, Japan
– Leather II (US), above n 19.
Out of the seven cases initiated by the United States three were against Japan. See GATT
Panel Report, Japan – Semi-Conductors, above n 19; GATT Panel Report, Japan – Agricultural
Products I, above n 19; GATT Panel Report, Japan – Leather II (US), above n 19. Two were
against Canada. See GATT Panel Report, Canada – Provincial Liquor Boards (US), ibid;
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one as respondent;22 and two as interested third party.23 A review of these
reports shows that, although the United States and other Contracting Parties
to the GATT 1947 recognized that the administration of a measure could give
rise to a claim, they preferred to address a measure as being inconsistent with
more ‘substantive’ provisions, such as Article XI:1 of the GATT 1947.24
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1947 prohibits quotas, import or export licenses,
or any other measure that in any manner restricts trade. The term ‘other measure’ can be interpreted broadly to cover a seemingly endless list of NTBs, including inter alia import licensing requirements, anti-dumping measures, and
health and safety regulation. The breadth of the Article XI:1 obligation allowed
GATT panels to find any measure inconsistent with the GATT 1947 without
having to refer to the ‘administrative’ or ‘subordinate’ claim of Article X.
Three of the nine adopted GATT 1947 cases involving Article X were
brought by either the United States or the European Community (EC) [formerly the European Economic Community (EEC)] against Japan.25 At issue in
those three cases was the level of transparency required under Article X.26
In Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather (Japan – Leather II (US)), the
United States challenged the administration of the Japanese quota system on
imported leather.27 The United States argued that the Japanese import leather
quota system violated Articles X:1 and X:3 of the GATT 1947 because Japan
had failed to publish the total import quotas and certain administrative
rulings related to it.28 Of particular concern was the fact that in administering

22
23

24

25

26

27
28

GATT Panel Report, Canada – Ice Cream and Yoghurt, ibid. One was against Korea: GATT
Panel Report, Korea – Beef (US), ibid.
See GATT Panel Report, US – Non-Rubber Footwear, above n 20.
Although not an official third party, the measure at issue was related to US actions forcing
Japan to limit its exports to the European market. See GATT Panel Report, Japan – SemiConductors, above n 19, para 4 (acknowledging the special nature of the matter and providing
for an adequate opportunity for the United States to participate). See also GATT Panel
Report, EEC – Parts and Components, above n 20.
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1947 states: ‘No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties,
taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or
other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation
of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for
export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.’ See WTO,
above n 1.
See GATT Panel Report, Japan – Semi-Conductors, above n 19; GATT Panel Report, Japan –
Agricultural Products I, above n 19; GATT Panel Report, Japan – Leather II (US), above n 19.
See GATT Panel Report, Japan – Agricultural Products I, ibid, para 5.4.1.4 (finding that the
practice of ‘administrative guidance’ is ‘a traditional tool of Japanese Government policy
based on consensus and peer pressure’ and thus finding that under the special circumstances
in Japan such administrative guidance could be considered a governmental measure). See also
GATT Panel Report, Japan – Semi-Conductors, above n 19, para 107 (clarifying the panel’s
analysis of ‘administrative guidance’ as a governmental measure in Japan – Agricultural
Products I).
GATT Panel Report, Japan – Leather II (US), above n 19.
Ibid, para 16.
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the leather quotas, Japan had allocated licenses so as to channel import
trade through Japanese producers and distributors. The United States
argued that Japanese producers had ‘no incentive to fully utilize the quota
amounts allocated to them.’29 The panel ruled that the Japanese quota
system was in violation of Article XI:1, and it did not need to address the
Article X issue.30
The second case involving Article X, Japan – Restrictions on Imports
of Certain Agricultural Products (Japan – Agricultural Products I), was decided
in 1988. In that dispute, the United States argued that the Japanese
quota system for certain agricultural products, in addition to violating
Article XI:1, also violated Articles X:1 and X:3. The United States alleged
that, in administering the agricultural quota system, Japan had failed to
‘publish adequate and timely information on quota volume or value’ contrary
to Article X:1, which constituted an unreasonable administration of the
import quota system in violation of Article X:3 (a).31 Japan responded
that there was no requirement to publish information beyond the total
amount of the quota to be issued and criteria for application. Japan further
argued that any additional disclosure of information as to the identity of the
quota holders and other related information was not acceptable as it would
only ‘cause unnecessary confusion’ and induce ‘anti-competitive intervention
among importers.’32 The panel found Japan’s import quota restrictions
inconsistent with Article XI:1, and declined to rule on the Article X
claims.33
Finally, in Japan – Trade in Semi-Conductors (Japan – Semi-Conductors),34 the
EC invoked Article X in connection with the Third Country Monitoring System
(Monitoring System) that was created by Japan pursuant to a voluntary export
restraint arrangement with the United States. At issue was the use of ‘administrative guidance’ by Japan in implementing the Monitoring System that recorded both the cost and sale prices of semi-conductors that were exported to
Europe and ‘encouraged’ Japanese exporters not to dump in the European
market.35 Although the panel decided that the case did not warrant a decision
on the Article X claim, it did recognize the important role ‘administrative guidance’ played in the promotion and enforcement of governmental policy in
29
30
31

32
33
34
35

Ibid, para 28.
Ibid, paras 44, 57.
GATT Panel Report, Japan – Agricultural Products I, above n 19, para 3.1.1. The United
States also argued that Japan had failed to meet the requirements of Arts X:1 and 3 ‘in terms
of transparency, specificity and timing of notice given’. (para 3.5.1).
Ibid, para 3.5.2.
Ibid, paras 5.4.2 and 6.2.
See GATT Panel Report, Japan – Semi-Conductors, above n 19.
Ibid, para 35 (outlining the EC argument that Japan’s administrative guidance controlled
export prices, export volume, production volume and other aspects related to exports. It
was also stated in Japan’s Position Paper that ‘Japan exercised administrative guidance to
achieve production cutbacks’).
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Japan.36 The panel, citing Japan – Agricultural Products I, stated that ‘the practice of administrative guidance . . . was a traditional tool of Japanese government
policy based on consensus and peer pressure,’37 implying that the workings
of Japan’s system of administrative guidance was not meant to be transparent.
Detailed discussion of Article X appears in only two GATT 1947 panel
decisions. First, in Canada – Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic
Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies (Canada – Provincial Liquor Boards
(US)),38 the panel concluded that Article X did not require Canadian provinces to provide ‘information affecting trade available to domestic and foreign suppliers at the same time, nor did it require Contracting Parties, to
publish trade regulations in advance of their entry into force.’39 Second, in
European Economic Community – Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples –
Complaint by Chile (EEC – Dessert Apples),40 the panel ruled that the specific
act of back-dating quotas on imports of dessert apples by the EEC was
inconsistent with the publication requirement of Article X. This is the
only adopted GATT 1947 decision to find a violation of Article X.
However, the panel also held that the EC’s administration of its quota
system was not in violation of the ‘uniformity’ requirement of Article
X:3(a). The panel concluded that the requirement of ‘uniformity’ in administration imposed by Article X:3(a) did not require EC Members to have
identical administrative procedures with regards to the import of dessert
apples. In reaching its conclusion, the panel emphasized the substantive provisions of the GATT 1947 by first finding violations of Article XI:1 and
Article XIII of GATT 1947 and then only finding a violation of Article X
with regards to the specific act of back-dating import restrictions from the
date of publication to have been a violation of Article X:1. 1947.41
In the remaining GATT 1947 cases, panels merely dismissed the Article X
claims as subsidiary issues that did not need to be addressed.42 The last
adopted GATT 1947 case involving an Article X claim was United States –
Countervailing Duties on Non-Rubber Footwear from Brazil (US – Non-Rubber
Footwear).43 The panel dismissed the Article X:3(a) claim as not being
within the terms of reference of the panel.44 Interestingly, this case does
36

37
38
39
40
41

42

43
44

Ibid, paras 35, 53, and 128. In that case, the Monitoring System had already been found to
be inconsistent with Art. XI:1 of the GATT 1947.
Ibid, para 107.
GATT Panel Report, Canada – Provincial Liquor Boards (US), above n 20.
Ibid, para 5.34 (emphasis added).
GATT Panel Report, EEC – Dessert Apples, above n 20.
Ibid, paras 12.29–30, (finding that minimal administrative differences by themselves could
not constitute a violation of Art. X:3 and that the administration of the quotas was a violation
of Art. XIII).
See GATT Panel Report, Canada – Ice Cream and Yoghurt, above n 20; GATT Panel Report,
Korea – Beef (US), above n 20.
GATT Panel Report, US – Non-Rubber Footwear, above n 20.
Ibid, para 6.2.
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foreshadow a line of cases discussed below where administration of trade
remedies by the United States DOC is challenged as being inconsistent,
among other things, with the requirements of Article X:3(a).
IV. THE EXPANSION OF THE WTO TRADE MANDATE AND ITS IMPACT
ON ARTICLE X

Upon creation of the WTO, Article X of GATT 1947 became Article X of
GATT 1994 and was included as part of Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement
without any amendment.45 Annex 1A also includes other trade agreements
that had been negotiated under the auspices of the GATT 1947 on trade in
goods.46 Article X is specifically mentioned in the following Annex 1A agreements: Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the GATT 1994
(Customs Valuation Agreement),47 Agreement on Rules of Origin,48 and
Agreement on Safeguards.49 The other Annex 1A agreements do not mention Article X, but do contain provisions addressing transparency and due
process in the administration of measures, including the Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement);50
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement);51 Agreement
on the Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 (Antidumping
Agreement);52 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(SCM Agreement);53 and the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures
(Licensing Agreement).54 Outside of trade in goods, the requirements of
Article X are replicated throughout the Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS)55 and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
45
46

47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

Paragraph 1 of the GATT 1994.
Under the GATT 1947, Contracting Parties could pick and choose which agreements they
wanted to sign and ratify while still maintaining their membership in the GATT. This changed
with the creation of the WTO, where Members are required to sign all of the relevant WTO
agreements. The Covered Agreements are the Agreements on Agriculture, Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures, Textiles and Clothing, Technical Barriers to Trade, Trade-Related
Investment Measures, Anti-Dumping, Custom Valuation, Pre-shipment Inspection, Rules of
Origin, Import Licensing Agreement, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and Safeguards.
WTO, above n 1, at 172.
Ibid, at 211.
Ibid, at 275.
Ibid, at 59.
Ibid, at 21.
Ibid, at 147.
Ibid, at 231.
Ibid, at 223.
Ibid, at 284. [Specifically, Art. III of the GATS (Transparency) largely follows the language of
Art. X of the GATT 1994 and requires publication of all relevant measures including international agreements affecting trade in services. In addition, Art. III of the GATS requires that WTO
members annually inform the WTO Council for Trade in Services of any changes made to the
laws that affect trade in services and the commitments that each member has made on that
agreement. It also requires all members to ‘establish one or more enquiry point to provide specific
information to other members’. Article VI of the GATS requires members to maintain ‘judicial,
arbitral or administrative tribunals’ to review administrative decisions affecting trade in services.]

10
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Property (TRIPS).56 In addition, the Trade Policy Review Mechanism
(TPRM) monitors ‘domestic transparency in government decision-making
in the trade policy-making area.’57 In view of the fact that Article X of
GATT is only applicable to trade in goods, this article will not discuss in
detail the scope of the transparency provisions of GATS, TRIPS or the
TPRM.
The relationship between the transparency and due process obligations of
Article X of GATT 1994 and the provisions of the other Annex 1A agreements
is far from clear.58 The General Interpretative Note to Annex 1A (Interpretative
Note) states:
In the event of conflict between a provision of [GATT] 1994 and a provision of
another agreement in Annex 1A to the Agreement Establishing the [WTO],
the provision of the other agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict.59

There is no agreement on the interpretation of the term ‘conflict’ except in cases
where provisions directly contradict one another. Such a direct substantive
conflict is unlikely to arise in the context of Article X as it is concerned with
transparency and due process in the administration of a measure. This absence
of clarity begs a number of questions: What is the relationship between Article X
and the provisions of other Annex 1A agreements? When a measure falls within
the scope of an Annex 1A agreement is it still subject to the transparency and
due process requirements of Article X? Are Article X obligations independent of
the due process requirements of the other Annex 1A agreements? How should
the term ‘to the extent of the conflict’ as stated in the Interpretative Note be
construed in relation to Article X?
As the discussion below will show, WTO panels and the Appellate Body
have held that the Interpretative Note does not prohibit concurrent application of Article X of GATT 1994 and provisions of other Annex 1A agreements. But, as a general rule, panels and the Appellate Body have tended to
56

57

58

59

Ibid, at 321 [Art. 63 of the TRIPS (Transparency) requires publication of all intellectual property related measures and notification to the WTO Council for TRIPS. In addition, Art. 63.3
allows Members to object to another Member’s specific judicial and administrative rulings in
the area of intellectual property and to request detailed written justification for the ruling].
Ibid, at 308. Part B of the TPRM states:
Domestic Transparency—Members recognize the inherent value of domestic
Transparency of government decision-making on trade policy matters for both
Members’ economies and the multilateral trading system, and agree to encourage
and promote greater transparency within their own systems, acknowledging that the
implementation of domestic transparency must be on a voluntary basis and take
account of each Member’s legal and political systems.
This is important not only within the context of Art. X, but also the other ‘substantive’
provisions of GATT 1994, including: Arts. I (most-favored-nation), II (tariff commitments),
III (non-discriminatory application of internal measure), and Art. XI:1 (prohibition on quotas
and NTBs).
WTO, above n 1, at 16.
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focus on more specific provisions of the other Annex 1A agreements. This
focus on the relevant provisions of Annex 1A agreements (as opposed to
GATT 1994) has not resulted in complete marginalization of Article X
requirements of transparency and due process.
V. INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE X GATT

1994:

EMERGING FROM

OBSCURITY

Since the founding of the WTO, there have been at least twenty cases involving consideration of Article X of the GATT 1994,60 and almost half of
60

WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Selected Customs Matters, above n 10; Panel Report, EC –
Selected Customs Matters, above n 10; WTO Appellate Body Report, WTO Panel Report, United
States – Measures Relating to Shrimp from Thailand, WT/DS343/R, circulated 29 February 2008;
WTO Panel Report, United States – Customs Bond Directive for Merchandise Subject to AntiDumping/Countervailing Duties (US – Customs Bond Directive), WT/DS345/R, circulated 29
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WTO Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel Plate in Coils and
Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip from Korea (US – Stainless Steel), WT/DS179/R, Adopted on 1
February 2001; WTO Panel Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides
and the Import of Finished Leather (Argentina – Hides and Leather), WT/DS155/R, Adopted on 16
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these cases have been brought against the United States and have concerned
the administration of safeguard, anti-dumping and countervailing duty laws.
A wide variety of countries at differing levels of economic development have
invoked Article X including: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Thailand,
Turkey, and the United States. In contrast to the GATT 1947 days, no
WTO Member has referred to their Article X claim as a ‘subsidiary’ claim.
Some Article X claims brought before WTO panels and the Appellate Body
have continued the GATT 1947-era practice of deferring a discussion of the
provision in favor of other GATT 1994 violations. However, even in such cases,
panels and the Appellate Body have refrained from stating that an Article X
claim is a subsidiary issue. As the discussion below will show, even in cases
where the panels or the Appellate Body have not found a violation of Article
X, they have underscored the importance of Article X obligations and engaged
in extensive discussions of the scope and meaning of its provisions. In addition,
unlike the GATT 1947 years, WTO panels and the Appellate Body have repeatedly found measures to be inconsistent with the provisions of Article X, including: Argentina – Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of
Finished Leather (Argentina – Hides and Leather),61 Dominican Republic –
Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes (Dominican
Republic – Import and Sales of Cigarettes),62 EC – Selected Customs Matters,63
and United States – Customs Bond Directive for Merchandise Subject to AntiDumping/Countervailing Duties (US – Customs Bond Directive).64
In the WTO era, Article X of GATT 1994 was first analyzed in 1997
by the Appellate Body in United States – Restrictions on Imports of
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DS69/AB/R, Adopted on 23 July 1998; WTO Panel Report, European Communities – Measures
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July 1998; WTO Panel Report, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry,
WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, Adopted on 23 July 1998; WTO
Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper (Japan –
Film), WT/DS44/R, Adopted on 22 April 1998; WTO Panel Report, European Communities
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WT/DS/27/R/MEX, 25 September 1997; WTO Appellate Body Report, European
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III), WT/DS/27/AB/R, Adopted on 25 September 1997; WTO Appellate Body Report,
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States – Underwear), WT/DS24/AB/R, Adopted on 25 February 1997); WTO Panel
Report, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear
(United States – Underwear), WT/DS24/R, Adopted on 25 February 1997.
Panel Report, Argentina – Hides and Leather, ibid.
Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, above n 60.
Appellate Body Report, EC – Selected Customs Matters, above n 10.
Panel Report, US – Customs Bond Directive, above n 60.
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Cotton and Man-Made Fiber Underwear (United States – Underwear), which
stated:
Article X:2 . . . may be seen to embody a principle of fundamental importance—that of promoting full disclosure of governmental acts affecting
Members and private persons and enterprises, whether of domestic or foreign
nationality. The relevant policy principle is widely known as the principle of
transparency and has obviously due process dimensions. The essential implication is that Members and other persons affected, or likely to be affected,
by governmental measures imposing restraints, requirements, and other
burdens, should have a reasonable opportunity to acquire authentic information about such measures and accordingly to protect and adjust their
activities or alternatively to seek modification of such measures . . .65

The Appellate Body’s identification of the fundamental importance of Article
X lies in sharp contrast to earlier panel discussions of Article X under GATT
1947. The reference to transparency and due process values enshrined in the
text of Article X have been widely quoted by subsequent WTO panels. Of
particular significance is the Appellate Body’s view that Article X’s transparency and due process protections extend to administrative actions taken by
Members in relation to their own citizens (i.e. internal governance, as well as
in relation to foreign traders). Another point highlighted by the Appellate
Body in United States – Underwear is that Article X, unlike other GATT
provisions, is explicitly concerned with the rights and expectations of traders.
Finally, the Appellate Body clarified that Article X allows challenges to the
administration of measures that are otherwise WTO consistent.
The importance of Article X was also underscored by the Appellate Body
in United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products
(US – Shrimp).66 In that case, the Appellate Body held that a US measure
prohibiting importation of shrimp or shrimp products fell within the scope of
Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994 as a measure that was aimed primarily at
the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource, giving effect to restrictions on domestic production or consumption.67 But the US conservation
measure failed the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX because the
United States applied the measure in a manner that constituted arbitrary and
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail.68 The Appellate Body went on to state:
Provisions of Article X:3 of the GATT 1994 bear upon this matter. In our
view Section 609 [the United States restriction on shrimp imports] fall
within the [scope of] Article X:1. Inasmuch as there are due process
65
66
67
68

Appellate Body Report, US – Underwear, above n 60, at 20 (emphasis added).
Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, above n 60.
Ibid, para 113.
Ibid, para 177.
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requirements generally for measures that are otherwise imposed in compliance with WTO obligations, it is only reasonable that rigorous compliance with the fundamental requirements of due process should be required in
the application and administration of a measure which purports to be an
exception to the treaty obligations . . .69

The Appellate body in US-Shrimp also goes on to state that the US measure
at issue, Section 609, was applied in a manner that was ‘‘contrary to the
spirit, if not the letter, of Article X:3 [of GATT 1994]’’.70
A. The scope of measures covered under Article X:1 of the GATT 1994
Article X requires that ‘laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative
rulings of general application’ (collectively ‘measures’) be promptly published
and administered ‘uniformly, impartially and reasonably.’71 Panels and the
Appellate Body, on the whole, have given the term ‘general application’ a generous interpretation so as not to limit the scope of measures covered under
Article X:1. In European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas (EC – Bananas III),72 the panel and the Appellate
Body stated that Article X applies to both internal measures and border measures.73 In Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper
(Japan – Film), the panel held that a measure qualifies under Article X:1 as
an administrative ruling of general application even if it is addressed to only a
specific company or shipment if such a ruling establishes or revises principles
applicable in future cases.74 This reasoning was followed in Argentina – Hides
and Leather,75 in which the panel held that a resolution that permitted representatives of the domestic tanning industry to be present during the customs
process of export clearance was an administrative measure of general application under Article X:1 even if only one company benefited from it.76
In anti-dumping cases, however, panels have been reluctant to find specific
dumping determinations ‘measures of general application’. In United States –
Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan
(United States – Hot-Rolled Steel),77 the panel held that a specific antidumping ruling in a particular case did not qualify as a measure of general
application. Nevertheless, the panel did state that in certain circumstances,
69
70
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Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, above n 60, para 182.
Ibid, para 183.
Articles X:1 and X:3(a) of the GATT 1994, see WTO, above n 1.
Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, above n 60; Panel Report, EC – Bananas III, above
n 60.
Panel Report, EC – Bananas III (Mexico), above n 60, para 7.206; Appellate Body Report,
EC – Bananas III, above n 63, para 70. Interestingly, the EC responded that Art. X ‘only
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Panel Report, Japan – Film, above n 60, paras 10.384–10.388.
Panel Report, Argentina – Hides and Leather, above n 60.
Ibid, para 10.5.
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the outcome of a single antidumping investigation could have ‘significant
impact on the overall administration of the law’ and therefore could be
considered a measure of general application within the scope of Article
X:1.78 In 2004, in Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, the
panel decided that a survey taken by the Dominican Republic’s Central Bank
on average prices of cigarettes was an ‘administrative ruling of general application’ and should have been published because it was ‘an essential element of
an administrative ruling’ within the scope of Article X:1.79
In sum, panels and the Appellate Body have adopted an expansive interpretation of the term ‘measures of general application’, which includes any specific
act of administration that has a ‘significant impact’ on the overall administration of the law or any government action, including a survey, which subsequently forms a basis for an administrative ruling. At the same time,
however, panels and the Appellate Body have retained the flexibility
to exclude a measure from the scope of Article X:1 if they determine that
it does not have a significant impact on the overall administration of a measure.
B. The scope of Article X:3 of the GATT 1994
Article X:3(a) requires WTO Members to ‘administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all its laws, regulations . . . and administrative
rulings of the kind referred to in Article X:1’ Article X:3(b) and (c) require
independent or ‘objective and impartial review’ of all administrative actions
that relate to customs matters.
WTO panels and the Appellate Body have interpreted the term ‘applied
uniformly’ to mean that ‘customs laws should not vary, that every exporter
and importer should be able to expect treatment of the same kind, in the
same manner over time and in different places and with respect to the other
persons.’80 Panels have also stated that ‘access to’ and ‘flow of information’
are essential to meeting the due process requirements of Article X:3(a). The
panel in Argentina – Hides and Leather stated that ‘the requirement of reasonableness and impartiality . . . both relate to the question of information’ and
that unless ‘access to information’ is uniform and reasonable the administration of a measure cannot be impartial.81 Panels have also emphasized that
the three requirements of Article X:3(a) are not cumulative, and that a
measure must satisfy all three requirements separately.82 In Argentina –
Hides and Leather, the panel pointed out that Article X:3(a) applies to the
substance of an administrative measure.83 Panels have also held that the
78
79
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Ibid, para 7.268.
Panel Report, Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes, above n 60, paras 7.405–406.
Panel Report, Argentina – Hides and Leather, above n 60, para 11.83.
Ibid, para 11.86.
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scope of Article X:3(a) is not limited by the most-favored-nation (MFN)
requirement. There is no requirement that Article X:3(a) be applied only
in situations where the measure has been applied in an inconsistent manner
with respect to the imports from or exports to two or more Members.84
There has been great reluctance in applying the provisions of Article
X:3(a) to specific anti-dumping actions. In United States – Anti-Dumping
Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One
Megabit or Above from Korea (US – DRAMS), Korea argued that the due
process values of Article X:3(a) renders every action taken by the DOC in
administering anti-dumping measures susceptible to scrutiny.85 Similarly, in
United States – Hot-Rolled Steel, Japan argued that the scope of Article X:3(a)
was broader than the covered agreements because the standards contained in
Article X:3 represent in one sense the notion of good faith and in another
sense the ‘fundamental requirements of due process,’ and that these principles should be applied to the manner in which the DOC administered the
anti-dumping laws.86
In Dominican Republic – Import and Sales of Cigarettes, the panel defined the
term ‘reasonable’ as ‘in accordance with reason, not irrational or absurd,
proportionate.’87 The panel ruled that the administration of the provisions
of the Selective Consumption Tax was ‘unreasonable’ and in violation of
Article X:3(a) because it used the ‘nearest similar product’ to determine
the tax rate on imported cigarettes while that was not the criteria that had
been stated in the regulation. The Dominican Republic acknowledged the
problem with using the nearest similar product and removed the measure
while the case was before the panel. Nevertheless, the panel engaged in a
relatively extensive discussion of the meaning of the term ‘reasonable’ in
Article X:3(a) and ruled that the Selective Consumption Tax, as it was
administered prior to the change, was unreasonable.
C. Protecting the expectations of traders
A distinguishing feature of WTO-era Article X jurisprudence has been that
the panels have looked towards the expectations of private individual traders
who operate in the market place. For example, in United States – Sunset
Reviews of Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from
Argentina (US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews) the panel concentrated on showing the ‘real effect’ of the DOC’s sunset reviews on
‘foreign traders operating in the commercial world’.88 This is unique
within the context of the GATT and the WTO where emphasis has been
84
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on ‘expectations of a competitive relationship’ between the Members based on
a system of reciprocity and mutual concessions.
In Argentina – Hides and Leather, the panel addressed the issue of the
expectation of traders as follows:
Article X:3(a) requires an examination of the real effect that a measure
might have on traders operating in a commercial world. This, of course,
does not require a showing of trade damage, as that is not generally a
requirement with respect to violations of GATT 1994. But it can involve
an examination of whether there is possible impact on the competitive
situation due to alleged partiality, unreasonableness or lack of uniformity
in application of custom rules . . .89

The direct and explicit reference to ‘expectations of traders’ is significant in
at least two respects. First, it emphasizes the importance of Article X as
private traders ask their governments to focus on the lack of transparency
and uniformity in the application of internal or border measures. Second, it
underscores the good governance mandate of the WTO as an organization
that is expected to protect the expectations of private actors (not only
governments) by safeguarding transparency, accountability and other due
process values. This, in turn, demonstrates the evolution of the system
away from one based on reciprocal bargaining and mutual concessions
among Members to a system that promotes rules of good governance.
D. Relationship of Article X of GATT 1994 and the WTO agreement
There is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the relationship between the
provisions of GATT 1994, including Article X, and other Annex 1A agreements. The Interpretative Note to Annex 1A does not solve this problem as
it only provides that, in cases of ‘conflict’ between the GATT 1994 and other
Annex 1A agreements, the provision of the other agreement prevails but only
to the ‘extent of the conflict.’90 What does ‘conflict’ mean when dealing with
Article X’s relationship to another agreement? As might be expected, the
answer to this question is not clear and seems to vary depending on the
other agreement at issue.
In United States – Underwear, Costa Rica argued that the United States’
safeguard action against imports of cotton and manmade fiber underwear
was inconsistent with both the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC)91
and Article X:2 of the GATT 1994.92 The panel held that a transitional
safeguard measure was subject to the publication requirements of Article
X:2 as well as the ATC. On appeal, the Appellate Body overturned the
89
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Article X:2 violation, but on the ground that Article X:2 does not address
whether or not a Member can give retroactive effect to a safeguard measure.
While it did not expressly address the relationship between the provisions of
the GATT 1994 and the text of other agreements, the Appellate Body in
United States – Underwear did clearly imply that both can apply.93
The relationship between Licensing Agreement and Article X was
addressed in EC – Bananas III, in which the panel interpreted the term
‘conflict’ in the Interpretative Note narrowly to include only those instances
where a provision in one agreement prohibits what another agreement explicitly permits or where a Member cannot comply with both the requirements
of another Annex 1A agreement and Article X.94 The Appellate Body agreed
with the panel that the Interpretative Note allows for the application of both
Article X:3 and the Licensing Agreement, but ruled that the panel should
have applied the Licensing Agreement first, as it was the more specific and
detailed agreement.95 If the panel had applied the Licensing Agreement first,
the Appellate Body reasoned, ‘then there would be no need for it to
address . . . Article X:3(a) of GATT 1994.’96
This GATT 1947-like approach of ignoring the requirements of Article
X:3 was challenged in European Communities – Measures Affecting Importation
of Certain Poultry Products (EC – Poultry).97 The panel in EC – Poultry found
that, unlike the EC – Bananas III case, even after reviewing the Licensing
Agreement, it was obliged to look at Article X:3(a). The panel reasoned that
this was appropriate because the Licensing Agreement was only relevant to a
portion of the measure at issue, while the scope of Article X was broader.98
In contrast to the Licensing Agreement, panels have been reluctant to
apply Article X:3(a) to measures falling within the scope of the
Antidumping Agreement. In United States – Hot-Rolled Steel the panel stated:
Where we have found a particular action or category of action is not
inconsistent with a specific provision of the AD Agreement, we are
93
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Report, EC – Poultry, above n 60, para 114.
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faced with the question whether a Member can be found to have violated
Article X:3(a) . . . we have serious doubts as to whether such a finding
would be appropriate.99

While this statement does not make Article X:3 explicitly inapplicable to the
Antidumping Agreement, it is clear the panel did not find it is appropriate to
apply the due process provisions of Article X:3 to the administration of antidumping measures in addition to the due process requirements of the
Antidumping Agreement. The applicability of the terms of Article X:3(a)
to the administration of US anti-dumping laws was argued forcefully by
Korea in US – DRAMS:
WTO Agreements are a unitary whole. The transparency and uniformity
obligations of Article X apply to the WTO Agreements, including the
[Anti-Dumping Agreement] . . . the Member must administer each statute,
regulation, and administrative ruling in a way that complies with Article
X:3. Thus Article X applies to each and every action of the [DOC] . . .100

In response, the panel was reluctant to apply Article X:3(a) to the DOC’s
actions:
. . . we have grave doubts as to whether Article X:3(a) can or should be
used in the manner advocated by Korea. As the United States correctly
points out . . . [Article X:3(a)] was not intended to function as a mechanism to test the consistency of a Member’s particular decision or rulings
with the Member’s own domestic law and practice; that is a function
reserved for each Member’s domestic judicial system . . .101

The discomfort of panels in reviewing the administrative structure of a Member
is understandable. However, that is what Article X:3(a) allows by giving
Members the right to challenge the administration of particular measures.
VI. THE EC

–

SELECTED CUSTOMS MATTERS DISPUTE

Some sixty years after its inclusion in the GATT 1947, Article X was
invoked as the sole legal basis for a trade dispute. In EC – Selected Customs
Matters,102 the United States claimed that the EEC system of customs
administration ‘as a whole’ was not administered uniformly as required by
Article X:3(a).103 In its complaint, the United States also pointed to the
99
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specific non-uniform application of valuation rules and the administration of
customs regulations to imports of liquid crystal display (LCD) monitors and
blackout drapery. The United States argued that the lack of any mechanism
at the EEC level to address divergences in customs administrations was a
violation of the uniformity requirement of Article X:3 (a).104
The panel agreed that the EC’s system of custom administration as a
whole is ‘complicated and, at times, opaque and confusing.’105 In fact, the
panel further stated:
We can imagine that the difficulties we encountered in our efforts to
understand the EC’s system of customs administration would be multiplied for traders in general and small traders in particular who are trying
to import into the European Communities.106

Nevertheless, the panels dismissed the ‘as a whole’ challenge as not
within the panel’s terms of reference.107 The panel did mention, however,
that ‘there is nothing in the DSU nor in other WTO agreements that
would prevent a complaining Member from challenging a Member’s
system as a whole or overall.’108 The panel did find violations of Article
X:3(a) due to non-uniform classification of LCD monitors and blackout
drapery linings, and the non-uniform administration of valuation rules
by EC members.109
On appeal, the Appellate Body held that the EC’s system of customs
administration could be challenged ‘as a whole or overall’ under Article
X:3(a) and that such a challenge was within the scope of the terms of
reference.110 The Appellate Body went on to hold that the administrativesubstantive distinction maintained in EC – Bananas III and EC – Poultry did
not exclude the possibility of allowing challenges to the substance of a measure that leads to inconsistent administration. Specifically, the Appellate
Body stated that earlier rulings did ‘not exclude . . . the possibility of challenging under Article X:3(a) the substantive content of a legal instrument that
regulates the administration of a legal instrument of the kind described in
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Article X:1.’111 Thus, a Member can challenge the substantive content of a
legal instrument if such content determines the administration of that regulation, so long as it can be shown that the substantive measure necessarily
leads to lack of uniform, impartial or reasonable administration in violation
of Article X:3(a).112 The Appellate Body held that mere differences in customs laws among EC member states did not necessarily breach the uniformity requirement in Article X:3(a), unless such differences actually lead to
non-uniform administration in specific cases.113
Having found that the EC system can, in principle, be challenged as a
whole, under Article X:3(a), the Appellate Body sidestepped the ‘as a whole’
challenge by stating that the record does not provide the Appellate Body with
enough facts to decide such a claim. Furthermore, the Appellate Body
reversed two specific panel findings of inconsistency with Article X:3(a)
relating to the administration of customs penalty laws and audit procedures
and the tariff classification of blackout drapery, and upheld only the finding
that the tariff classification of certain LCD monitors amounted to nonuniform administration in violation of Article X:3(a) and the panel’s dismissal of the claim relating to Article X:3(b).114 In this landmark case, by
further blurring the administrative-substantive distinction, the Appellate
Body sanctioned the wider use of Article X and opened the door for
future claims including challenges to the substance of laws as a whole.115
VII. THE ‘CULTURE’ OF THE WTO DSM AND THE FUTURE OF ARTICLE X

The evolution of the jurisprudence of the Article X under the WTO has
expanded the scope of Article X through interpretations of its provisions
and blurring the distinction relied on by earlier panels between a substantive
and an administrative measure. The culture of the WTO DSM is such,
however, that expansive interpretations of Article X are not necessarily
accompanied by application of Article X requirements in specific cases.
111
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distinction states that only measures that ‘mandate’ WTO–inconsistent action should be
challenged ‘as such’, and all discretionary measures that may or may not result in WTO
inconsistent administration should be challenged ‘as applied’. In EC - Selected Customs
Matters, the Appellate Body held that member states can challenge the substance of measures
regardless of the mandatory or discretionary substance of the measure. A fuller discussion of
this distinction is beyond the scope of this article. For further discussion of mandatory/
discretionary distinction, see e.g. WTO Appellate Body Report, United States—Anti-dumping
Act of 1916, WT/DS136/R, WT/DS136/AB/R, Adopted on 26 September 2000; WTO Panel
Report, United States—Section 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R, Adopted on
27 January 2000.
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It is also unclear the extent to which due process requirements of Article
X:3(a) are applicable to measures that fall within the scope of various Annex
1A agreements.
Article X:3(a) requirements have not been applied to the Antidumping
Agreement, but they have been found to be concurrently applicable with
the due process requirements of the Licensing Agreement. Some Members
of the WTO view the administration of US trade remedy laws (specifically in
the anti-dumping context) to be inconsistent with Article X:3(a) requirements of uniformity, impartiality and reasonableness.116 It is, therefore,
likely that Article X will continue to be asserted against the United States,
the original architect of Article X, as Members emphasize values of fundamental due process, such as transparency and access to information. Panels
and the Appellate Body are unlikely to apply Article X to the administration
of US trade remedy laws. Instead, panels will likely continue to focus on the
specific procedural provisions of the Antidumping Agreement, SCM
Agreement, and the Agreement on Safeguards.
Such an approach is consistent with the culture of the DSU. For example,
in EC – Selected Customs Matters, the Appellate Body expanded the scope of
measures that can be challenged under Article X:3(a), but at the same time
largely reversed the panel’s finding of inconsistency with Article X:3(a) and
only affirmed the panel’s finding that the non-uniform administration of the
tariff classification of LCD monitors by EU members was a violation of
Article X:3(a). Similarly, in Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of
Cigarettes, there is an extensive discussion of the meaning of the term ‘reasonable’ in Article X:3, even though the measures at issue had already been
withdrawn. In US – DRAMS, the panel addressed Article X:3 only to conclude that the inconsistency of the measure with the Antidumping
Agreement rendered examination of Korea’s claims under Article X unnecessary. The seeming discrepancy between the relatively extensive discussions
of the requirements of Article X:3(a), and the refusal of the panels to rule on
Article X claims is consistent with the culture and practices of the DSM.
The practice under the DSU is to avoid making controversial decisions,
while incrementally developing the jurisprudence so that future panels and
the Appellate Body can accommodate the expansion of the WTO mandate
into areas that go beyond the traditional sphere of securing or promoting
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Most recently, in 2008 India brought an action against the imposition of anti-dumping duties
by United States on imports of shrimp from India, claiming a violation of Art. X:3 in
addition to the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and Arts XI, XIII, and II of the GATT 1994.
The panel, however, on the basis of judicial economy, did not address any of the GATT
1994 claims after having found the measures inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. It is noteworthy, that India attempted to make both ‘as applied’ and ‘as such’
claims under Art. X:3(a) with the latter being rejected by the panel for being untimely. See
Appellate Body Report, US – Customs Bond Directive, above n 60.
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trade liberalization, and into promoting good governance within
Members.117
Recent interpretations of the scope of Articles X:1 and X:3(a) have
expanded the scope of those provisions. The ruling in EC – Selected
Customs Matters, that a system as a whole can be challenged under Article
X:3(a), will likely encourage Members to bring additional complaints.
Specifically, Article X challenges to the EC’s system of customs administration are likely to continue given the view expressed by the panel that the EC
customs regulations can be opaque and confusing. In addition, United States
– Shrimp has made the jurisprudence of Article X applicable ‘in spirit’ if not
‘in letter’ to the chapeau of Article XX. It is therefore possible that the
developing jurisprudence of Article X, and specifically of Article X:3(a),
may be used to interpret the application of Article XX measures or to
otherwise guide the interpretation of the chapeau of Article XX.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Article X of the GATT 1994 is the oldest good governance provision of the
WTO Agreements. A close study of its history and evolving jurisprudence
contributes to an understanding of the emerging role of the WTO as a
potential supra-national regulatory body and the final arbiter of appropriate
administrative and regulatory structures.118 The broad language of Article X
allows the WTO to review domestic administrative legal regimes based on
interpretation of the terms: uniform, impartial, and reasonable. Applying
those standards to administrative acts and practices of WTO Members,
particularly in the context of claims against administrative systems as a
whole, could raise serious concerns if seen as interfering in the internal governance of Members. Although such increased reference to fundamental
values of transparency and due process may be a sign of an emerging consensus on the elements for good governance, it also has the potential to
undermine the utility of such values if they are not addressed or applied in
an even-handed manner by panels and the Appellate Body.
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See Debra P. Steger, ‘The Culture of the WTO: Why It Needs to Change’, 10 Journal of
International Economic Law 483 (2007), at 485–86. As Professor Steger writes: ‘The mandate and purpose of the WTO is no longer clear. The mandate of the GATT system was
continuing the process of trade liberalization. . .the preamble to the GATT 1947 reflected
these goals. The preamble of the WTO Agreement is broader – it includes the goals of
environmental sustainability and development. . .but they have not become part of the
accepted theology or culture of the WTO as perceived by its members. So, there is a
difference between what the preamble of the WTO says the purpose of the organization is
and what its members perceive it to be.’
The work of the TPRM and committees in the area of good governance as expressed in Art.
X must also be studied to get a fuller picture of the good governance mandate of the WTO.
Such work is necessary to assist the DSU in its application of Art. X.
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The WTO is no longer a system simply based on consensus, reciprocity,
and a balancing of concessions. Rather, it is a system based on rules that
reflect the reality of the administrative state. The goal of the multilateral
trading system is no longer free trade (if it ever was) but rather trade that
is regulated in a WTO-consistent manner. As a result, the good governance
provisions of the WTO, those addressing transparency and due process, are
increasingly central to WTO disputes. Fortunately, the multilateral trading
system is very adept at making incremental change. To date, the Appellate
Body and panels have been, in most cases, reluctant to find a measure
inconsistent with the obligations of Article X:3(a), but have continued to
build the jurisprudence of Article X:3(a) through interpretation of its provisions and applauding the values it enshrines.119
There is much at stake in how the DSM addresses future transparency
claims. There is great discrepancy among Members in terms of their administrative structures and institutional capacity and the DSM may not be the
most appropriate forum to address such differences. It is possible that countries with advanced and complicated regulatory structures may feel more
vulnerable to charges of inconsistency with transparency and due process
obligations of the WTO. It is therefore important that the WTO acknowledge its good governance mandate through coordination between the transparency related works of its various committees and the TPRM’s mandate to
monitor domestic transparency in trade decision-making area. This coordination could also assist the DSM in interpreting and applying the transparency related obligations of the WTO Agreements.
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Another example of incremental change has been Art. XX of the GATT 1994, where the
Appellate Body discussed at great length the need to justify environmental measures under
Art. XX and elaborated on how Art. XX should be read and applied years before they
actually found a measure justified under Art. XX. In 1999, in the aftermath, of United
States - Shrimp, I wrote: ‘the Appellate Body’s analysis of Article XX generally and subparagraph (g) in particular. . .indicates that although supporters of Article XX interests [environmentalists] may have lost the battle, the prospects look good for winning the war’. See
Padideh Ala’i, ‘Free Trade or Sustainable Development? An Analysis of the WTO Appellate
Body’s Shift to a More Balanced Approach to Trade Liberalization’, 14 American University
International Law Review 1129 (1998), at 1170–71

